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Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
and 
Emmie West SEP 2 62000 CWRU Law School, Class of 2002 
This article summarizes most of the United States 
Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions of the last 
term. 
CONFESSIONS: MIRANDA 
The most publicized criminal procedure decision of the 
term was Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000), 
which offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to overrule 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Two years after 
Miranda was decided, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501, 
which provides for the admissibility of a confession as long 
as the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the 
confession was voluntary. Unlike Miranda, § 3501 does 
not require that the suspect be warned of the right against 
self-incrimination and the right to counsel. 
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that 
"Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may 
not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we de-
cline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that 
Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibili-
ty of statements made during custodial interrogation in both 
state and federal courts." 120 S.Ct. at 2329-30. 
In holding that Miranda was a constitutional decision, the 
Court relied on: (1) the fact that Miranda had been applied 
to proceedings in state courts, a domain in which the 
Supreme Court's authority is limited to enforcing the 
Constitution, (2) the text of the Miranda opinion, which com-
mences with the statement that certiorari was granted "to 
give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement 
agencies and courts to follow," 384 U.S. at 441-42, and goes 
on to include other references to the Court's belief that it 
was adopting a constitutional rule, and (3) the Miranda 
Court's encouragement of legislative action to protect the 
right against self-incrimination, as long as such action was 
"at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their 
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it." ld. at 467. 
The court of appeals, in its decision overruling Miranda 
and upholding § 3501, relied on cases in which the 
Supreme Court had recognized exceptions to Miranda. The 
Court agreed that it had made exceptions, but that these 
cases stood only for the principle that "no constitutional rule 
is immutable." 120 S.Ct. at 2335. An alternative argument in 
favor of the court of appeals' decision was made by the ami-
cus curiae, who stated that § 3501 is as effective as 
Miranda. The Court did not agree, since "§ 3501 explicitly 
eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation warnings in 
favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such 
warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness 
of a suspect's confession:· ld. The Miranda Court imposed 
specific warnings because it believed the traditional totality-
of-the circumstances test involved too much of a risk that an 
involuntary statement would be admitted into evidence. 
Since the test in § 3501 required only the totality of. the cir-
cumstances, without the specific warnings from Miranda, 
the Court held that "[s]ection 3501 therefore cannot be sus-
tained if Miranda is to remain the law." ld. at 2336. 
The Court stated that it would not overrule Miranda, 
based on the prinCiple of stare decisis. In order for the 
Court to depart from precedent, there must be a "special 
justification." ld. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
842 (1991)). The Court found no such justification for over-
ruling Miranda, which "has become embedded in routine po-
lice practice to the point where the warnings have become 
part of our national culture." ld. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Flight as Justification for a Terry Stop 
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000), the defendant 
fled upon seeing police officers patrolling in an area known 
for narcotics trafficking. Two officers caught Wardlow and 
conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. 
Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested the 
defendant. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, upheld the 
stop. 
Police have a right to stop and question individuals, and 
individuals have a right to not respond. "And any 'refusal to 
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cooperate, Without more, does not furnish the minimal level 
of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.' 
But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooper-
ate. Flight, by its very nature, is not 'going about one's busi-
ness'; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers con-
fronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate 
further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go 
about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the 
face of police questioning." ld. at 676 (quoting Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S.429, 437 (1991)(citation omitted)). 
In order for a police officer to conduct a Terry stop, 
the officer needs reasonable suspicion. An "inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' does not 
rise to the level necessary to constitute a reasonable 
suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968}. Ho\AJever, 
officers are allowed to consider all relevant factors, in-
cluding the characteristics of the surroundings and the 
individual's behavior. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, ruled that the defendant's unpro-
voked flight upon seeing the officer and his presence in 
a high crime area are relevant and constitute a "reason-
able, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot." 120 S.Ct. at 675. As the Court put it: "Headlong 
flight -wherever it occurs - is the consummate act of 
evasion: it is -not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, 
but it is certainly suggestive of such." ld. at 676. The 
Court, however, did not adopt a per se rule under which 
flight always justified a stop. 
Terry Stops: Anonymous Tips 
The issue in Florida v. J.L., 120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000), was 
whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun 
is, without more, sufficient to justify a stop and frisk. An 
anonymous caller reported that a young black male stand-
ing a:t a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 
carrying a gun. The call was not recorded, nothing was 
known about the informant, and the informant did not give 
any other information to show whether he had any familiarity 
with the suspect's affairs or future movements. The police 
responded to the report, arriving at the scene within six min-
utes. There were three black males at the bus stop, and 
one was wearing a plaid shirt. The officers did not see a 
firearm, and the males did not act in any unusual way upon 
seeing the approaching officers. One officer frisked the 
male wearing the plaid shirt (J.L.) and found a firearm. The 
second officer frisked the other two men and found nothing. 
The Court ruled, in a unanimous vote, that the frisk was 
unconstitutional. The Court noted that the "reasonableness 
of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers 
knew before they conducted their search. All the police had 
to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, un-
accountable informant who neither explained how he knew 
about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had 
inside information about J. L." I d. at 1379. The Court also 
stated that an "anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability ... 
does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it al-
leges the illegal possession of a firearm." ld. at 1380. 
In so ruling, the Court rejected a "firearms exception," 
under which a lower standard of suspicion would suffice: "A 
second major argument advanced by Florida and the United 
States as amicus is, in essence, that the standard Terry 
analysis should be modified to license a 'firearm exception.' 
Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would 
justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail stan-
dard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this 
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position." ld. at 1379. 
Justice Kennedy, writing a concurrence in which the 
Chief Justice joined, distinguished different types of anony-
mous tips: "If the telephone call is truly anon¥mous, the in-
formant has not placed his credibility at risk and can lie with 
impunity. The reviewing court cannot judge the credibility of 
the informant and the risk of fabrication becomes unaccept-
able." ld. at 1381. In contrast, an informant who places his 
anonymity at risk, by approaching an officer in person or by 
calling a police station with caller identification, for instance, 
should be treated differently. 
Manipulation of Baggage 
The Supreme Court in Bond v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 
1462 (2000), addressed the issue of whether a Border 
Patrol Agent's tactile inspection of the outer surface of a 
carry-on bag constituted a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that it 
did. 
Bond was a passenger on a bus that stopped in Texas for 
a border patrol check. The agent boarded the bus and veri-
fied the citizenship of the passengers. As the agent left the 
bus, he ran his hand along the luggage stored in the over-
head bins, squeezing each bag. The agent felt something 
"brick-like" in Bond's bag. Bond admitted the bag belonged 
to him and gave the agent permission to open it. Upon in-
spection, the agent discovered a brick of methampheta-
mine. 
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district 
court, holding that the agent's "manipulation of the bag was 
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 
United States v. Bond, 167 F.3d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1999). 
The Supreme Court reversed, in a decision written by Chief 4 
Justice Rehnquist. · 
The Fourth Amendment grants the "right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures .... " The Court 
held that "[a] traveler's personal luggage is clearly an 'effect' 
protected by the Amendment." 120 S.Ct. at 1464. In analyz-
ing whether the manipulation of the luggage was a search, 
the Court looked at two elements: (1) "whether the individ-
ual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of 
privacy" and (2) "whether the individual's expectation of pri-
vacy is 'one that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able."' ld. at 1465 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
740 (1979)). As to the first element, the Court found that 
Bond had exhibited an expectation of privacy by putting his 
belongings in a bag and placing the bag above his seat. As 
to the second element, the Court found that although it is 
reasonable for a traveler to expect his or her bag to be han-
dled, it is not reasonable to expect that others will "feel the 
bag in an exploratory manner." ld. Because the two ele-
ments were satisfied, the Court held that the agent's manip-
ulation of the bag violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Crime Scene Exception 
In Flippo v. West Virginia, 120 S.Ct. 7 (1999), the defen-
dant was vacationing with his wife at a state park, when he 
called 911 to report an attack on himself and his wife. The 
officers who responded to the call found petitioner with in-
juries to his head and legs and his wife inside the cabin with ~ 
fatal head wounds. The officers questioned the defendant 
and took him to a hospital. They closed off the area and 
later searched the cabin for 16 hours. When they found a 
briefcase inside the cabin, they opened it and seized the 
contents, which included evidence. 
The defendant was indicted for the murder of his wife and 
moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the closed 
briefcase. The police had not obtained a warrant. His mo-
tion to suppress the evidence was denied. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that there is no general "crime 
scene exception" to the warrant requirement, citing Mincey 
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), which had rejected any 
general murder scene exception. The Court remanded, not-
ing that its decision was limited to this one issue and that it 
was not commenting on any other possible theories that 
might satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
FIFTH AMENDMENT: iMMUNITY 
The first issue addressed by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Hubbell, 120 S.Ct. 2037 (2000), was 
whether the defendant's disclosure of the existence of docu-
ments was protected by the privilege against self-incrimina-
. tion. The second issue was whether the government could 
prepare criminal charges against the defendant based on 
the contents of documents produced after a grant of immu-
nity. The Court, in an 8-1 decision, found for the defendant 
on both issues. 
As part of a plea bargain, Hubbell pled guilty to mail fraud 
and tax evasion and agreed to provide the Independent 
Counsel with information relqting to the ongoing Whitewater 
investigation. In an attempt to discover whether Hubbell 
was indeed providing the promised information, the 
Independent Counsel served him with a subpoena duces 
tecum, asking for the production of documents before a 
grand jury in Little Rock, Arkansas. Hubbell appeared and 
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation; he refused to state whether he had any documents 
responsive to the subpoena. The prosecutor produced an 
order directing Hubbell to answer and granting him immuni-
ty. Hubbell then produced 13~ 20 pages of documents, an-
swering that those were all of the responsive documents, 
except for a few protected by the attorney-client and work-
product privileges. The contents of the documents led the 
Independent Counsel to bring criminal charges against 
Hubbell for tax-related crimes as well as mail and wire 
fraud. 
"Act of Production" Rule 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment is limited to "testimonial" 
evidence. The Court explained that criminal suspects can 
be compelled to engage in conduct that might be incriminat-
ing, such as providing blood samples or handwriting exem-
plars, but could not be compelled to communicate incrimi-
nating facts or beliefs. The Court held that Hubbell's pro-
duction of documents was testimonial in nature. 
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court 
had held that incriminating documents must be produced if 
their creation was not "compelled." In Fisher, the documents 
in question were working papers used by an accountant in 
preparing an income tax return. These documents were 
voluntarily prepared, so they were not "compelled." 
However, the Court has recognized that the act of producing 
documents can sometimes have a testimonial effect. For 
example, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the 
mere turning over of documents to the grand jury was a pro-
tected testimonial communication, since production was an 
admission of the witness's control of the documents, the 
documents' existence, and their authenticity. The Court held 
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that Hubbell's testimony was "compelled" as described in 
Doe. In comparing Hubbell's case to Fisher, the Court 
found that in Fisher the Government already knew the docu-
ments existed and were with the taxpayer's attorneys, 
whereas in Hubbell's case, the Government had no prior 
knowledge of the documents Hubbell produced. 
Immunity 
The Court held that the Fifth Amendment extended not 
only to incriminating evidence but also to information that 
can lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence. The 
Court held that "respondent's act of producing subpoenaed 
documents was the first step in a chain of evidence that led 
to this prosecution." 120 S.Ct. at 2046. In Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Court had held that a per-
son with immunity does not have to prove that his or her tes-
timony was used improperly. Instead, the burden is on the 
prosecution "to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is 
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 
compelled testimony." ld. at 460. In this case, the 
Government could not do so; in fact the Government admit-
ted it only learned of the crimes because of the documents 
produced by Hubbell. 
The Government argued that it was not going to use the 
documents at trial, but the Court stated that the question 
was not whether the Government would use the documents 
later, but whether "it has already made 'derivative use' of the 
testimonial aspect of that act [of production] in obtaining the 
indictment against respondent and in preparing its case for 
trial. It clearly has:' 120 S.Ct. at 2046. 
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, joined by 
Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas stated that only allowing the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination fortes-
timonial evidence may be inconsistent with the original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. He argued that "witness" 
was broadly defined at common law to mean "one who 
gives evidence." ld. at 2053. Justice Thomas stated, "In a 
future case, I would be willing to reconsider the scope and 
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause." ld. at 2050. 
COMMENT ON DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE 
In Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S.Ct. 1119 (2000), the prose-
cutor, in her summation, called the jury's attention to the fact 
that the defendant had the opportunity to hear all other wit-
nesses testify and to tailor his testimony accordingly. The 
defendant argued that these comments burdened his Sixth 
Amendment right to be present at trial and to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him, as well as his Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights to testify on his own behalf. 
The Court, in an opinion· by Justice Scalia, rejected these 
arguments. The Court refused to extend the rule in Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Griffin involved comments 
upon a defendant's refusal to testify. The trial court instruct-
ed the jury that it was free to consider the defendant's failure 
to deny or explain facts within his knowledge. The Supreme 
Court held that such a comment, by "solemnizing the si-
lence of the accused into evidence against him," unconstitu-
tionally "cuts down on the privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion] by making its assertion costly." ld. at 614. Griffin was 
thus based on the Fifth Amendment. "The prosecutor's 
comments in this case, by contrast, concerned respondent's 
credibility as a witness, and were therefore in accord with 
our longstanding rule that when a defendant takes the 
stand, 'his credibility may be impeached and his testimony 
assailed like that of any other witness."' 120 S.Ct. At 1125 
(quotingBrown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)). 
See also Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989)("When [a 
defendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that 
generally apply to other witnesses - rules that serve ~he 
truth-seeking function of the trial - are generally applicable 
to him as well."); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235-36 
(1980) (A defendant who takes the stand is "subject to 
cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like any 
other witness.") (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 
U.S. 391,420 (1957)); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 
301' 305 (1895). 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS: "DRAWING THE STING" 
The defendant in Ohler v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1851 
(2000), was charged with drug. offenses. She had a previ-
ous felony conviction for methamphetamine possession. 
The Government filed motions in limine for admission of 
Ohler's prior conviction as impeachment evidence under 
Federal Evidence Rule 609(a)(1 ). The district court subse-
quently ruled that the prior conviction would be admissible if 
Ohler testified. 
Ohler did testify, and during her testimony she admitted 
to the prior conviction. She was found guilty. Ohler ap-
pealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the prior 
conviction to be used as impeachment evidence. The court 
of appeals affirmed, holding that Ohler waived her objection 
since she introduced the evidence in direct examination. In 
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court first 
cited the general waiver rule that "a party introducing evi-
dence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was er-
roneously admitted." ld. at 1853. 
Ohler contended that the waiver rule should not apply in 
her situation. She argued that it would be unfair to force a 
defendant to wait for the prosecution to introduce the prior 
conviction, since the jury might think the defendant was try-
ing to hide something. The Court questioned whether a de-
fendant's credibility would really be threatened in this situa-
tion. The Court went on to say that even if the jury did find 
the defendant more credible for introducing the evidence 
during direct examination, that credibility would be unwar-
ranted because the jury would not know that the only rea-
son the defendant .introduced the prior conviction was be-
cause he or she failed to have it excluded. 
Ohler also argued that her right to testify was unconstitu-
tionally burdened. The Court stated that there was no such 
burden: "[T]he rule in question does not prevent Ohler from 
taking the stand and presenting any admissible testimony 
which she chooses." ld. at 1855. Accordingly, "a defendant 
who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction 
on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the ad-
mission of such evidence was in error." ld. 
Because this decision is not constitutionally based, it 
does not automatically apply in state court. 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES: JURY TRIAL 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), the ac-
cused shot into the house of an African-American family. 
He admitted to the shooting and stated that he had fired the 
shots because he did not want the family in the neighbor-
hood (he later retracted the statement). Apprendi was in-
dicted on 23 counts, including four different shootings and 
unlawful possession of weapons. 
New Jersey has a hate crime statute, which allows the 
trial judge to extend the term of imprisonment if the judge 
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finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defen-
dant "acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or 
group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handi-
cap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000). 
After plea bargaining, Apprendi pled guilty to two counts 
of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful 
· purpose and one count of third-degree unlawful possession 
of an antipersonnel bomb. Each second-degree offense 
was punishable by 5 to 1 0 years. The plea agreement gave 
the State the right to request an enhanced sentence for the 
shooting at the African-American family's home, based on 
the hate crime statute. Under the statute, if Apprendi was 
found guilty of a hate crime, he could face 1 0 to 20 years for 
the second-degree offense instead of 5 to 1 0 years. The 
plea agreement also gave Apprendi the right to challenge 
any hate crime sentence. 
The State filed a motion for an extended sentence, and 
the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
Apprendi's actions violated the hate crime statute. Apprendi 
was sentenced to 12 years for the count relating to the 
shooting, despite the maximum penalty of 1 0 years. 
Apprendi appealed, arguing that the Due Process Clause 
required a jury niust find him guilty of a hate crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for him to be punished in accor-
dance with the statute. 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the trial 
court did err: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. 
The Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process, "[t]aken together ... indisputably entitle a criminal 
defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every 
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt."' ld. at 2355-56 (quoting United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). After discussing the de-
velopment of trial by jury in the criminal law setting, the 
Court stated: 
The historic link between verdict and judgment 
and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to 
operate within the limits of the legal penalties provid-
ed highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme that 
removes the jury from the determination of a fact 
that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a 
penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if 
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict alone. ld. at 2359. 
The Court also pointed out that the requirement of "proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt;' as established by In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), was based in part on 
the fact that criminal defendants face a loss of liberty and 
stigmatization if convicted. By increasing the maximum 
sentence, the loss of liberty and amount of stigma are like-
wise increased; therefore, the Court reasoned that the "de-
fendant should not ... be deprived of protections that have, 
until that point, unquestionably attached." 120 S.Ct. at 2359. 
The Court cited several of its previous decisions. It re-
ferred to Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), which 
applied the same rule -that increases in maximum sen-
tences based on any fact other than a prior conviction must 
be made by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt- to a federal statute. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
477 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court allowed for "sentencing fac-
tors" to be determined by a judge. However, the. McMillan 
Court held that states could not use sentencing factors to 
alter maximum sentences or to create separate offenses 
with separate penalties. ld. at 87-88. In concluding, the 
Court stated, 'The New Jersey procedure challenged in this 
case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition 
that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." 
120 S.Ct. at 2366. 
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion Uoined in part by 
Justice Scalia), engaged in a historical analysis of what is 
meant by a "crime" and concluded that the majority's rule is 
not broad enough. He argued that a '"crime' includes every 
fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punish-
ment," id. at 2368, including the fact of prior conviction. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Self-Representation on Appeal 
In Martinez v. California Court of Appeal, 120 S.Ct. 684 
· (2000), the defendant was a paralegal charged with convert-
ing a client's money to his own use. He represented himself 
at trial and was acquitted of grand theft but convicted of em-
bezzlement. Martinez filed a notice of appeal, along with a 
motion to represent himself. The California Court of Appeal 
denied the motion, and the California Supreme Court de-
nied Martinez' application for a writ of mandate. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
California Supreme Court, holding that requiring Martinez to 
be represented by a state-appointed attorney did not de-
prive Martinez of any constitutional right. In Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Court held that there is 
a constitutional right to go to trial without counsel. The 
Court determined that the holding in Faretta was limited to 
trial and did not extend to appeal. 
The Court analyzed the rationale of Faretta and deter-
mined that, although some of the reasoning applied to ap-
peals, there were distinctions. The Faretta Court relied on 
the fact that the right to self-representation had been recog-
nized throughout history. However, the reason for the right 
was originally because there were few competent lawyers, 
and this reasoning does not have the same force today. 
Also, appeals were not widely recognized in colonial United 
States, and there was no criminal appeal in England until 
1907. The Faretta Court's reliance on the Sixth Amendment 
does not apply, since the Sixth Amendment only deals with 
trial. 
The Faretta Court also relied on individual autonomy as a 
reason for self-representation. The Court agreed that indi-
vidual autonomy was equally relevant to trial and appellate 
procedure. However, the Court stated that courts must bal-
ance the defendant's autonomy with the integrity and effi-
ciency of the legal system: "Considering the change in posi-
tion from defendant to appellant, the autonomy interests that 
survive a felony conviction are less compelling than those 
motivating the decision in Faretta. Yet the overriding state 
interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice re-
mains as strong as at the trial level." Martinez v. California 
Court of Appeal 120 S.Ct. 684, 692 {2000). In addition, the 
Court called its holding "narrow," as the states can modify 
their constitutions to include a right to self-representation on 
appeal. 
Ineffective Assistance: Consultation on Appeals 
In Roe v. Flares-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000), the de-
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fendant pled guilty pursuant to a California rule permitting a 
defendant both to deny committing a crime and to admit that 
there was sufficient evidence for conviction. State law de-
manded the filing of a notice of appeal within 60 days of 
conviction. The defendant was in lock-up for the first 90 
days after sentencing, and his appointed public defender did 
not file the notice of appeal. When the defendant tried to file 
a notice of appeal after about four months, it was rejected 
as untimely. The defendant then alleged ineffective assis-
tance of counsel based on his appointed public defender's 
failure to file a notice of appeal on his behalf after promising 
to do so. The Ninth Circuit adopted a per se rule of ineffec-
tiveness for failure to file a notice of appeal unless the ac-
cused specifically instructs counsel not to do so. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the per se rule as 
inconsistent with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). Instead, the Court held that "counsel has a constitu-
tionally-imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an 
appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a ratio-
nal defendant would want to appeal (for example, because 
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this 
particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel 
that he was interested in appealing. In making this determi-
nation, courts must take into account all the information 
counsel knew or should have known." 120 S.Ct. at 1 036. 
The Court also observed: "If counsel has consulted with the 
defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily 
answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreason-
able manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express 
instructions with respect to an appeal. If counsel has not 
consulted with the defendant, the court must in turn ask a 
second, and subsidiary, question: Qvhether counsel's failure 
to consult with the defendant itself constitutes deficient per-
formance." I d. at 1035 (citation omitted}. 
Further, to demonstrate prejudice the defendant must 
show that counsel's deficient performance actually caused 
his harm. "Accordingly, we hold that, to show prejudice in 
these circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's defi-
cient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would 
have timely appealed." ld. at 1038. Because of the record, 
the Court remanded: "Based on the record before us, we 
are unable to determine whether Ms. Kops had a duty to 
consult with respondent (either because there were poten-
tial grounds for appeal or because respondent expressed in-
terest in appealing), whether she satisfied her obligations, 
and, if she did not, whether respondent was prejudiced 
thereby." I d. at 1040. 
Ineffective Assistance: Anders Briefs 
In Smith v. Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746 (2000}, the respon-
dent was convicted in state court of second-degree murder 
and grand theft of an automobile. His appointed counsel 
believed that an appeal would be frivolous. The counsel fol-
lowed the requirements set forth in People v. Wende, 25 
Cal.3d 436, 600 P.2d 1071 (1979), by filing a brief summa-
rizing the procedural and factual history of the case, with ci-
tations to the record. The defendant also availed himself to 
his right under Wende to file a pro se supplemental brief. 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the 
defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel. 
The California procedure set forth in Wende did not require 
counsel to disc1,1ss the merits of the case or state that, upon 
review, he has concluded an appeal would be frivolous. 
Instead, counsel submitting a Wende brief offers to brief any 
issues directed by the court. In contrast, Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967}, requires appellate counsel 
to raise issues in an appellate brief when seeking to with-
draw from representation because he believes that the ap-
peal would be frivolous. 
The Court noted that the states are permitted to devise 
their own procedures, so long as those procedures are with-
in the confines of the Constitution. States will not be forced 
to use a single solution in dealing with difficult problems of 
policy: "[T]he Anders procedure is merely one method of 
satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for indigent 
criminal appeals. States. may- and, we are confident, will 
-craft procedures that, in terms of policy, are superior to, 
or atleast as good as, that in Anders. The Constitution 
erects no barrier to their doing so." 120 S.Ct. at 759. The 
Wende procedure "affords adequate and effective appellate 
review for criminal indigents. Thus, there was no constitu-
tional violation in this case simply because the Wende pro-
cedure was used." ld. at 763. 
The Court next discussed some of the weaknesses of 
the Anders rule as well as some advantages of the Wende 
rule. For example, Wende "requires both counsel and the 
court to find the appeal to be lacking in arguable issues, 
which is to say, frivolous." ld. at 761. Also, under Wende 
counsel does not seek to withdraw but is available to brief 
issues that the appellate court finds meritorious. 
Ineffective Assistance: Capital Sentencing 
In Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000}, the defen-
dant, while in custody on an unrelated offense, wrote a letter 
confessing to killing a man. After questioning, Williams ad-
mitted he killed the man and took three dollars from his wal-
let. He was convicted of robbery and capital murder. At the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecution offered evidence of 
Williams' prior convictions for armed robbery, burglary, and 
grand larceny. The prosecution entered Williams' confession 
letter and described Williams' attack of an elderly woman 
and his conviction for arson while awaiting trial. Expert wit-
nesses for the prosecution testified that Williams posed a 
continuing threat to society. 
Williams' counsel offered character testimony by 
Williams' mother and two neighbors (one of whom was 
asked to testify while in the audience at the proceedings). 
His couns"el also entered recorded testimony from a psychi-
atrist stating that Williams had removed bullets from his gun 
in earlier robberies so that he would not hurt anyone. In 
closing argument, Williams' counsel stated that it would be 
difficult for the jury to justify sparing Williams' life. Counsel 
did not investigate Williams' juvenile record because they 
thought the law prohibited them from doing so. If they had 
performed such an investigation, they would have discov-
ered mitigating factors such as physical abuse and his par-
ents' arrest for criminal neglect of their children. Williams' 
counsel also failed to introduce evidence of Williams' bor-
derline mental ret(;!rdation and sixth-grade education. In ad-
dition, counsel did not introduce evidence of Williams' good 
behavior in prison, such as helping bust a drug ring and 
turning in a guard's lost wallet, nor did they put on testimony 
from prison officials who believed Williams was nonviolent. 
An accountant who was respected by the community and 
had visited Williams in prison as part of a ministry program 
called Williams' counsel and offered to testify on Williams' 
behalf. Counsel failed to return his call. 
Based on the evidence at the sentencing hearing, the 
jury unanimously fixed the punishment at death, and the 
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trial judge imposed the death sentence. The Virginia 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. 
Williams filed a petition for habeas corpus with the state 
court. The Circuit Court found that the trial was valid but 
that Williams's counsel was ineffective at the sentencing 
hearing. Based on its finding, the Circuit Court recommend-
ed a rehearing on the sentencing phase. The Virginia 
Supreme Court reversed. Even assuming Williams' counsel 
was ineffective, the Virginia Supreme Court determined that 
the omitted evidence would not have affected the sentence 
and that Williams had not demonstrated the hearing was 
unfair. 
Williams then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. 
The federal trial court reversed, affirming the decision of the 
state Circuit Court. But the federal court of appeals re-
versed, construing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which was enact-
ed as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), as requiring a grant of habeas relief 
only if the state court "'decided the question by interpreting 
or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reason-
able jurists would all agree is unreasonable."' 163 F.3d 860, 
865 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Green v. French, 143 F. 3d 865, 
870 (4th Cir. 1998)). Since the court of appeals found the 
decision of the state trial court to be reasonable, it did not 
grant Williams' petition. 
In reversing, the Supreme Court first interpreted § 
2254(d)(1) and then applied the statute to Williams' claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Justice O'Connor deliv-
ered the opinion of the court on the issue of statutory inter-
pretation Uoined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy). The Court stated that the 
1996 version of§ 2254(d)(1), which governs Williams' case, 
changed the previous rule that federal courts owed state 
courts no deference in habeas cases. Now, in order to ob-
tain federal habeas relief, a defendant must show that the 
state's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 
U.S. C.§ 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed. Supp. Ill). The Court inter-
preted the "contrary to" clause to mean that a writ may be 
granted "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 
that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the 
state court decides a case differently than this Court has on 
a set of materially indistinguishable facts." 120 S.Ct. at 1523. 
The Court interpreted the "unreasonable application" clause 
to mean that a writ may be granted "if the state court identi-
. ties the correct governing legal principle from this Court's 
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts 
of the prisoner's case." ld. The Court stated that the Fourth 
Circuit erred in relying on the statement in Green v. French, 
143 F. 3d 865 (4th Cir. 1988), that a petition for habeas cor-
pus could only be granted if the state court applied federal 
law "in a manner that.reasonable jurists would all agree is 
unreasonable." 143 F.3d at 870. The Court explained that 
this "standard would tend to mislead federal habeas courts 
by focusing their attention on a subjective inquiry rather than 
on an objective one." 120 S.Ct. at 1522. 
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the court on the 
issue of statutory application Uoined by Justices O'Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). The Court held 
that the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, rejecting 
Williams' claim of ineffective counsel, was both "contrary to" 
and an "unreasonable application" of established law. The 
Court cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
the current law for proving ineffective assistance of counsel: 
"First the defendant must show that counsel's perfor-man~e was deficient....Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense .... " 
ld. at 687. The Court stated that the Virginia Supreme 
Court erred in holding that Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 
364 (1993}, modified Strickland. The counsel in Lockhart 
was deficient, but the counsel's ineffectiveness did not 
prejudice the defendant. The Court stated that de~isions 
such as Lockhart 
do not justify a departure from a straightforward ap-
plication of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of 
counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive 
or procedural right to which the law entitles him. In 
the instant case, it is undisputed that Williams had a 
right - indeed, a constitutionally protected right- to 
provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his 
trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to 
offer. 120 S.Ct. at 1513. 
JURY CHALLENGES 
In United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 120 S.Ct. 774 
(2000}, a potential juror indicated a bias for the prosecu-
tion. The trial judge erroneously refused to dismiss the 
juror for cause, and the defendant then exercised a 
peremptory challenge to remove that juror. The defendant 
also exhausted all the remaining peremptory strikes. The 
issue was whether Martinez-Salazar was denied any right 
under Federal Criminal Rule 24. 
The Court noted that peremptory challenges are not 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 'We have long recognized 
the role of the peremptory challenge in reinforcing a defen-
dant's right to trial by an impartial jury. But we have long 
recognized, as well, that such challenges are auxiliary; un-
like the right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, peremptory challenges are not of federal 
constitutional dimension." ld. at 779 (citations omitted). 
Consequently, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury is not violated by his use of a peremptory 
challenge to remove a potential juror that should have 
been removed for cause. So long as the jury that sits for 
the trial is impartial, the defendant has been afforded his 
Sixth Amendment right. 
As for due process, the Court noted that a "hard choice 
is not the same as no choice. Martinez-Salazar, together 
with his codefendant, received and exercised 11 peremp-
tory challenges (1 0 for the petit jury, one in selecting an al-
ternate juror). That is all he is entitled to under the Rule." 
ld. at 781. The Court further commented: "In choosing to 
remove Gilbert rather than taking his chances on appeal, 
Martinez-Salazar did not lose a peremptory challenge. 
Rather, he used the challenge in line with a principal rea-
son for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional 
guarantee of trial by an impartial jury." ld. at 781-82. 
The Court also noted the limitations on its holding: "It is 
not asserted that the trial court deliberately misapplied the 
law in order to force the defendants to use a peremptory 
challenge to correct the court's error. Accordingly, no ques-
tion is presented here whether such an error would war-
rant reversal. Nor did the District Court's ruling result in 
the seating of any juror who should have been dismissed 
for cause. As we have recognized, that circumstance 
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would require reversal." ld. at 782 (citation omitted). 
EX POST FACTO 
Changes in Evidence Rules 
In Carmel! v. Texas, 120 S.Ct. 1620 (2000), the 
Supreme Court addressed a subject for the first time in 
many years - the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
to changes in evidence rules. Prior to September 1, 1993, 
a Texas statute required one of three types of support for 
testimony by victims in certain sex crimes prosecutions -
indecency with a child, sexual assault, and aggravated 
sexual assault. The support for testimony included: (1) 
corroboration by other evidence, (2} corroboration by 
someone whom the witness informed within six months of 
the offense (a type of "fresh complaint" rule), or (3) the 
testimony alone, even without corroboration or fresh com-
plaint, if the victim was younger than 14 at the time of the 
offense. Effective September 1 , 1993, the statute was 
amended. The new statute included the same three re-
quirements, but the age for the victim in the third require-
ment was changed to under 18. 
Carmel! was convicted of 15 sexual offenses against his 
stepdaughter. He appealed four of his convictions, which 
involved conduct prior to September 1, 1993, during which 
time the victim was older than 14. Carmel! argued that ap-
plication of the new statute violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. Under the old statute, the victim's testimony would 
require corroboration. A Texas appellate court found 
against Carmel!, ruling that the statute was procedural and 
did not increase the punishment nor change the elements 
of the offense. 
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion delivered by 
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, and Breyer. The Court determined that the 
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it "'al-
ters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or differ-
ent testimony, than the law required at the time of the com-
mission of the offence, in order to convict the offender." ld. 
at 1626 (quoting Calderv. Bull, 3 Dall.386, 390 (1798)). 
Texas relied on Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 57 4 
(1994), in which the retroactive application of a witness 
competency provision was upheld as constitutional. Texas 
argued the statute in Carmell's case was likewise a wit-
ness-competency rule that did not affect the definition of 
the crime, its punishment, or the sufficiency of the evi-
dence required to convict. The Court rejected this argu-
ment, ruling that the statute was not a mere witness-com-
petency provision but was instead a sufficiency-of-the-evi-
dence rule. The language in the Texas statute stated that 
''[a] conviction ... is supportable on," whereas the language 
in Hopt referred to "determining the competency of wit-
nesses."110 U.S. at 587-88. Consequently, the Texas 
statute did not "simply enlarge the class of persons who 
may be competent to testify," nor did it "only remove exist-
ing restrictions upon the competency of certain classes of 
persons as witnesses." ld. at 589-90. 
In reversing, the Supreme Court quoted from Joseph 
Story's comments on the Ex Post Facto Clause: 
If the laws in being do not punish an offender, 
let him go unpunished; let the legislature, admon-
ished of the defect of the laws, provide against the 
,-v\ 
\ com~ission of future crimes of the same sort The 
escape of one delinquent can nev~r produces? much 
harm to the community, as may anse from the Infrac-
tion of a rule, upon which the purity of public justice, 
and the existence of civil liberty, essentially depend. 
Commentaries on the Constitution§ 1338 at 211, n.2. 
Extension of Intervals Between Parole Hearings 
In Garner v. Jones, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (2000), the Court con-
fronted a different ex post facto issue. The question before 
the Court was whether the retroactive application of a 
Georgia law permitting the extension of intervals between 
parole considerations violated the Clause. In 1974 respon-
dent began serving a life sentence for murder. He escaped 
five years later and committed another murder. 
Apprehended and convicted in 1982, he was sentenced to 
a second life term. At the time of respondent's second con-
viction, the Parole Board was required to consider parole 
after three years. In 1985, the rules were amended to re-
quire reconsideration every eight years. The board reinstat-
ed its earlier three-year rule and considered respondent for 
parole in 1992 and 1995. He was denied both times. In 
1995, the Board resumed scheduling parole reconsidera-
tions at least every eight years, and so at respondent's 1995 
review it set the next consideration for 2003. The Board's 
policy permits inmates to show a change in their individual 
circumstances, which could expedite reconsideration for pa-
role. 
On review, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: "The 
states must have due flexibility in formulating parole proce-
dures and addressing problems associated with confine-
ment and release." ld. at 1368. 'The idea of discretion is 
that it has the capacity, and the obligation, to change and 
adapt based on experience:' ld. at 1369. 'The Board's stat-
ed policy is to provide for reconsideration at 8-year intervals 
'when, in the Board's determination, it is not reasonable 'to 
expect that parole would be granted during the intervening 
years."' ld. at 1369-70 (citation omitted). Thus, the State's 
new policy did not act to increase respondent's punishment 
for the crime he committed prior to the enactment of the 
new policy. 
INTERSTATE DETAINERS 
The issue in New York v. Hill, 120 S.Ct. 659 {2000), was 
whether defense counsel's agreement to a trial date out-
side the time period required by Article Ill of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (lAD) bars the defendant from 
seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that pe-
riod. The lAD is a compact entered into by 48 States, the 
United States, and the District of Columbia to establish pro-
cedures for the resolution of one jurisdiction's outstanding 
charges against a prisoner of another. If a defendant is not 
brought to trial within the applicable 180-day period, the lAD 
requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. 
Defendants may waive their most basic rights and consti-
tutional protections. "Whether the defendant must partici-
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pate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures 
are required for waiver; and whether the defendant's choice 
must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the 
right at stake." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
{1993). Fundamental rights require the defendant's person- T 
al involvement for an effective waiver. E.g., Johnson v. 1): 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 {1938) (right to counsel); 
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (right to plead not 
guilty). For other rights, however, their attorneys may effec-
tively waive the right. "Although there are basic rights that 
the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and 
publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has 
- and must have- full authority to manage the conduct of 
the trial:' Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 {1988). In 
such cases, the defendant is "deemed bound by the acts of 
his lawyer-ag13ni and is considered to have 'notice of all 
facts, notice of which cari be charged upon the attorney."' 
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting 
Smith v. Ayer, 101 U:S. 320, 326 {1880)). 
Certain rights, including scheduling matters, may be 
waived by the action of counsel alone. "[T]he lAD 'contem-
plate[s] a degree of party control that is consonant with the 
background presumption of waivabiliiy."' ld. at 665-66. 
Furthermore, the lAD is a scheduling arrangement and 
therefore can be waived by counsel. 
DEATH PENALTY 
Jury Instructions 
Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 727 (2000), raised the 
issue whether the Constitution is violated when a trial judge 
directs a capital jury's attention to a specific paragraph of a 
constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a ques- ~-
tion regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circum- 1)) , 
stances. The defendant was a passenger in a car, which he j 
had previously stolen, when a State Trooper stopped the car 
after it sped by. The officer asked the driver and defendant 
to step out of the car, at which time the defendant fired his 
9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol six times, killing the officer. 
The defendant was arrested the next morning, and at that 
time he confessed to the crime. A jury trial ensued, and the 
jury asked the judge two questions during its deliberations. 
The judge answered the second question by instructing the 
jury to reread the second paragraph of the jury instructions. 
On review, the Court ruled: "Given that petitioner's jury 
was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge re-
sponded to the jury's question by directing its attention to 
the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate in-
struction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes 
whether the Constitution requires anything more. We hold 
that it does not." ld. at 732-33. The Court went on to write: 
"At best, petitioner has demonstrated only that there exists a 
slight possibility that the jury considered itself precluded 
from considering mitigating evidence. Such a demonstra-
tion is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation under 
Boyde, which requires the showing of a reasonable likeli-
hood that the jury felt so restrained." ld. at 734 (citing Boyde 
v. California, 494 U.S. 370 {1990)). 
